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Categories structure social domains. Theylocate actors in comparative sets and delin-
eate standards for evaluation. Social agreement
about what constitutes membership in categories
imposes constraint that induces actors to con-
form to categorical types. This is an instance of
a general dynamic that has long interested so-
ciologists: social structures constrain individual
actors, then widespread conformity leads to the
replication of the structures.
Research documents the homogenizing effects
of social categories. Organizations adopt similar
procedures, architectures, and even identities, not
only because the practices are effective but also
to conform to taken-for-granted ideas about how
to organize. What drives this dynamic is that ob-
jects have less appeal and receive fewer rewards
when they do not fit into an accepted category
(Zuckerman 1999; Hsu 2006; Hsu et al. 2009; Le-
ung and Sharkey 2014). In this view, complying
with categorical imperatives provides benefits. As
a result, actors conform to categorical standards
and existing category codes get replicated. This
rendering depicts agents as navigating a static
category structure when deciding how to classify
or make sense of objects and actors.
There is reason to question whether categor-
ical structures tend toward stasis. The vibrant
lines of research on categories and markets build
on the view that audiences and market intermedi-
aries create categories. Audience members come
to agree on labels and codes as they seek to inter-
pret action in a domain. Previous research has
focused on how agreed-upon categorical mean-
ings affect perceptions and evaluations. But the
converse also holds: the characteristics of ob-
jects that get categorized shape meanings. For
example, when telephone technology migrated
from rotary-dial to touch-tone, the meaning of
<telephone> evolved to include the new technol-
ogy.1 More generally, when an object changes its
characteristics or gets reclassified, this potentially
changes the meaning of one or more categories.
This means that social categories are less durable
than we generally assume.
The question of whether social structures af-
fect the behavior of individual actors, or whether
individual behaviors shape social structure, is
pertinent to many areas in sociological research.
Scholars studying institutions and organizational
forms maintain that social structures are homog-
1Throughout we mark terms from the language of the
domain, the so-called object language, with angle brackets.
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enizing and self-replicating while acknowledging
that these structures—and the meanings they
invoke—frequently change. This tension has been
extensively discussed as an important unresolved
issue in organizational sociology (Romanelli 1991;
Clemens and Cook 1999). That social struc-
tures are simultaneously rigid enough to induce
widespread conformity, and malleable enough to
change as a result of nonconformist behavior,
presents an underlying tension in the literature.
Recent work on classification sidesteps this
issue by assuming that category boundaries are
policed by market intermediaries such as stock
market analysts (Zuckerman 1999), credit agen-
cies (Ruef and Patterson 2009), critics (Hsu 2006;
Rao et al. 2003; Negro et al. 2010; Negro and Le-
ung 2013), and government agencies (Ruef 2000).
But what has historically interested sociologists
in categorization is that macro-level structures
emerge through uncoordinated individual beliefs
about social meaning embedded in objects or
concepts (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Durkheim
1931; Meyer and Rowan 1977). For instance, so-
ciological studies of markets show that stable
market structure can arise when organizations
independently take market positions in response
to positions taken by competitive rivals (White
1981; Porac et al. 1995). These ideas also un-
derpin recent work that models the emergence
of categories on the basis of audience members
coming to agreement about schemas that capture
the bases of similarity among objects (Hannan
et al. 2007).
We suggest that meaningful classification can
emerge even in an evolving environment com-
prising loosely coordinated actors. This occurs
when people observe current categorization, make
similarity judgments based on objects’ features,
classify them accordingly, and share their classifi-
cations. If the process is not coordinated, some
objects might get reclassified frequently. This can
change the meanings of categories, which then
alters how objects with stable categorizations
get interpreted. It might seem that this type of
process would lead to chaos, with meanings and
memberships changing too rapidly to coalesce
into a coherent system of categories. In contrast,
we show that classification can emerge even when
objects change features and categorical meanings
evolve.
We are struck that this will produce an eco-
logical dynamic for social categorization that op-
erates across two planes: feature space and label
space. Feature space locates objects by their
feature values. Label space contains labels for
categories. The two planes are connected when
agents apply a label to a profile of feature values.
When an audience reaches consensus about the
link between a label and a set of features, the
label denotes a category.
Associations between category labels and fea-
tures are straightforward in a static world. But
categorization becomes more complex when we
consider that the social meaning of categories
can change. For example, when many category
members alter their characteristics, this shifts
how people conceive of the category. This means
a focal category member who was once typical
of that category might become atypical. Such an
outcome characterizes obsolescence processes. A
scientist who still teaches and researches what
she learned decades ago might have been a highly
typical member of her discipline as a new grad-
uate but very atypical today. More generally,
changes in feature values by some members can
affect categorization for others.
A similar dynamic plays out for labeling. If
atypical entities are assigned membership in a
category—as when producers of processed foods
start being labeled as <natural>–then the cate-
gory will become less crisp. As a result, existing
members may no longer be considered typical of
the category. For instance, executives of organiza-
tions with nanotechnology capabilities concluded
that their organizations should not be included in
the <nanotechnology> category when the label
was used so broadly that its underlying meaning
no longer reflected their companies’ capabilities
(Granqvist et al. 2013).
We study these dynamics by building an ex-
plicit theoretical model of the coupling of feature
space and label space. Our model relies on two
processes, both based on similarity judgments.
The first involves the similarity of a newly ob-
served object to the current membership of a
category. We argue (and show empirically) that
feature-based similarities strongly influence label
assignments even as actors change positions in
both spaces. As objects move, conceptions of a
category can change, and so can its membership.
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But a link between features and labels persists.
In the <telephone> example, the sets of features
associated with this category have evolved from
rotary dial to touch-tone to touch-screens and
small hand-held electronic devices. The specific
characteristics associated with the concept have
changed, but it still retains a well-defined mean-
ing. The second process underlying our model
concerns the similarity of a focal category to other
categories. Our theory and empirical findings
imply that extensive overlap in category mem-
berships weakens the link between feature values
and label assignments. This can be seen in the
example of <nanotechnology>, which evolved to
overlap with a number of scientific disciplines
including organic chemistry, molecular biology,
semiconductor physics, and so on. Not only does
the meaning of this category evolve, so too does
the strength of the link between the label and set
of features expected of category members.
In addressing these issues we employ a for-
mal language proposed by Hannan et al. (2007)
and further elaborated by Hsu et al. (2009) and
Kovács and Hannan (2011). We think a formal
theory is needed because these notions can be
slippery and erroneous reasoning can easily re-
sult. Formal languages work against tendencies in
natural language to skip steps and misidentify re-
quired assumptions, which can lead to imprecise
conclusions.
Category Labels in a Domain
Labels play a central role in our analysis because
they denote concepts, mental representations of
similarity and difference (Murphy 2002). Al-
though such representations need not be paired
with labels, they often are. In the case of social
classification, we generally expect concepts to
labeled, otherwise people could not easily com-
municate about what they represent. Sociological
analysis focuses on categories, where a label not
only represents a concept for a particular indi-
vidual but also conveys broad agreement about
the pairing of a concept with a label, which gives
the label a social meaning. Because people use
labels to communicate about concepts and cat-
egories, much useful analysis can be done with
primary reference to their labels. For this reason
we can simplify the language of our argument
by restricting the term “label” to refer to tags
that are paired with meanings. We often refer to
labels as shorthand for the concepts/categories
that they designate.
We construct a theory for the general case
in which agents, as audience, classify producers.
Audience and producer are paired roles, and in
many contexts the same actors play both roles.2
That is, producers can be audience to each other.
We do not specify a particular kind of audience
because our assumptions plausibly describe pro-
cesses that apply for many kinds of agents playing
an audience role, including critics, consumers, ri-
vals, and the producers themselves.
We build our argument at the level of an indi-
vidual person as an audience member. This focus
cuts a layer of complexity that arises because
different audiences have different perspectives on
classification (Pontikes 2012; Hsu and Elsbach
2013). For example, RottenTomatoes.com and
IMDb.com agree in classifying Mel Brooks’s send-
up of the western Blazing Saddles as <comedy>
and <western>. But Rotten Tomatoes classifies
The Blues Brothers as <action/adventure> and
<comedy>, while IMDb classifies it as <com-
edy>, <music>, and <musical>. Our analysis
considers the issues from the perspective of indi-
vidual members of an audience.
Feature Space and Label Space
The received view of classification treats labels as
tied to fixed sets of feature values. If the relation-
ship between labels and features remains static,
then it is sufficient to model a single categorical
space that individuals and organizations navigate.
But once we allow the meanings of categories to
change—and the possibility of change to be con-
tingent on how actors navigate the categorical
structure—it is necessary to model the potentially
variable connections between the spaces. We aim
to explore how actors’ movements affect the sta-
bility of social classification. So, the bedrock of
our theory is a model of two spaces, feature space
and label space, and the mapping that connects
them. Feature space and label space are instanti-
2Scientific research provides a familiar example of
producers actively playing both roles, as researchers fre-
quently alternate between author and reviewer roles.
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ations of what Gärdenfors (2004) calls conceptual
spaces (see also Widdows 2004).
Research in psychology presents three stan-
dard accounts regarding the mental represen-
tation of concepts. A representation is stored
as (1) a prototype, a “best example,” (2) exem-
plars, known images of the concept, or (3) a
schema, a structured view of a concept (Smith
and Medin 1981; Murphy 2002). All three per-
spectives agree that an object’s observable char-
acteristics determine categorization. Research on
social categories as part of a cultural system has
concentrated on the third case, where concepts
are stored as schemas, which tell the patterns of
feature values that closely fit the concept (DiMag-
gio 1997). We follow this view in constructing
models.
We represent producers by their positions in
a feature space of observable characteristics. Pro-
ducers can lie at varying distances from each
other, and they move in this space when they
change their feature values. In formal terms, we
let F denote the space of the combinations of
feature values relevant to agents in a domain.3
For this (and many other sociological appli-
cations) feature space can be represented as a
weighted graph. Such a representation defines
nodes as feature profiles, combinations of fea-
ture values. Suppose that there are K relevant
features in a particular context. Then the set
of positions is the set of an ordered K-tuple of
feature values. For instance, if the features are bi-
nary, then there are 2K positions (vertices in the
graph space). We can specify this type of space
using a graph relation that tells which vertices
are accessible from which other vertices. To rep-
resent this, the crucial issue concerns how many
features can be changed at one time. Analysis is
greatly simplified if we assume that only one fea-
ture value can be changed at a time.4 This means
that the edges in the graph connect positions that
differ on only one feature value.
To fix ideas, consider Figure 1, which depicts
the graph for a space defined for three binary fea-
3In our construction a feature is a dimension such as
the form of authority in an organization. Positions in
feature space are vectors of the values of a set of features,
for example, traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic
forms of authority.
4Hannan et al. (2003) discuss these issues in the context
of organizational change and consider ways of relaxing
this constraint.
tures (with the restriction that edges connect only
those vertices that differ by one feature value).
Each of the eight vertices gives a profile of feature
values. For example, (0,0,0) describes the posi-
tion for which each of the three relevant features
has the value of zero. The edges connect vertices
that differ on only one value, for example, the
vertex (0,0,0) is connected to (1,0,0), (0,1,0), and
(0,0,1). The vertices in this diagram are what we
call feature profiles.
In a standard graph space, distance is given by
path length, specifically the length of the shortest
path that connects a pair of nodes. In our con-
struction, each edge is associated with a transfor-
mation distance, a real-valued weight that refers
to the scale of the change required to move from
one configuration to another (Hahn et al. 2003).
We define a distance between positions (vertices)
as the scale of transformation required to convert
from one set of feature values to another. So
the distance from (0,0,0) to (1,0,0) is the scale of
the transformation needed to change the first fea-
ture from 0 to 1. If this feature is, say, the form
of authority, then a much deeper organizational
transformation is required to shift from tradi-
tional to rational-legal (to use two of Weber’s
types) than to change more technical features.
We treat distances as subjective judgments
from the view of a focal agent and also allow the
possibility that the structure of the space morphs
over time. Precision demands that we tune the
formal notation to fit these considerations by
including argument slots for the agent and the
time point in the distance function. Economy
of expression argues the opposite. We use the
more economical representation and omit from
our notation the dependence of each predicate
and function on these arguments. But each func-
tion and predicate should be considered as depen-
dent on the agent and on the time point. With
this convention we express distance in feature
space as dF (v, v′), the scale of the transformation
required to convert from configuration v to the
configuration v′. The pair 〈F, dF 〉 defines the
metric feature space.
The second space of interest is also a graph
space, one whose vertices are labels. We refer
to this space as a label space, represented as L.
Distances in this space, denoted as dL(l, l′), tell
the distances between labels. Again we allow
the possibility that distances between adjacent
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(0,0,0) (0,0,1)
(0,1,0)
(1,0,0)
(0,1,1)
(1,1,1)(1,1,0)
(1,0,1)
Figure 1: Example of a feature space with three binary features.
vertices might differ. The pair 〈L, dL〉 defines the
metric label space.
We need to control the scope of label space,
because social actors use many kinds of labels.
Some of them are related, but others are not, for
example, a person might be labeled as <Hungar-
ian>, <logician>, and <archer>. This difference
matters, because movements among related cate-
gories can affect the structure in a way that moves
among unrelated categories do not. For theoreti-
cal analysis, it suffices to restrict the scope of the
arguments to cases in which the language has a
relatively simple structure. We use the notion
of a domain, a super-category whose included
categories compose the set to be analyzed (Han-
nan et al. 2007). Within such a structure, the
schemas for all of the subcategories contain the
codes for the supercategory’s schema (along with
other differentiating codes). These categories are
related within the language of the audience that
makes these distinctions. The scope of our theory
is restricted to a single domain.
In addition, we restrict the scope of label
space to include labels at the same hierarchi-
cal level. If we do not do this, then analysis of
the interdependence of movements among cate-
gories gets very complicated without shedding
additional insight. We limit the scope to sets of
categories within a domain that satisfy the re-
striction that none of the categories considered in
the analysis is a subcategory of any other. When
we refer to a label, it should be considered to be
the tag for a category that is an element in the
common language of the focal domain.
Relation between the Spaces
Social classification emerges from the association
of labels with features through schematization. A
key element of our theoretical development—one
not present in other work on social categorization—
is that we define explicitly the mapping between
features and labels. Our conceptualization builds
on the following considerations about the nature
of schematization:
1. Schematization ties labels to sets of feature-
value profiles.
2. The mapping is partial; not all feature pro-
files are schematized.
3. The agent’s language is coherent in the
sense that different labels point to distinct
collections of profiles. That is, the sets of
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profiles (not particular feature values) asso-
ciated with different labels do not intersect.
4. Schematization preserves distance, meaning
that distance in one space can be inferred
from distance in the other.
We can make these abstract ideas somewhat
more concrete with an example. Figure 2 depicts
two graphs and a mapping connecting them. The
feature space contains five feature profiles denoted
a through f (each individual profile is a set of
feature values, as illustrated in Figure 1). Again
the edges connect profiles that differ on only one
feature value. The spacing between vertices indi-
cates the transformation distance between them.
The label space contains three tags: 1, 2, and 3.
The morphism we want to characterize maps a
and b to 1 and c to 2, d and e to 3, and does not
associate a label with f . The absence of edges
connecting labels preserves the absence of edges
between schemas. The set of schemas that have
a common label are shaded in the figure. The
dotted lines display the details of the mapping.
The next step is to provide a formal char-
acterization of the relation between the spaces.
Intuition suggests that the mapping be defined
from feature space to label space because the exis-
tence of clusters of feature values induces labeling
(Hannan et al. 2007). However, consideration of
the list of desiderata (and the figure that exem-
plifies them) suggests otherwise. All labels are
schematized, but not all combinations of feature
values belong to a schema. We can obtain the
first three desiderata by defining a one-to-one
mapping from labels to sets of feature-value pro-
files. Such a mapping yields an isomorphism.
If we add that the mapping preserves structure,
namely, distance, then the isomorphism has the
form of an embedding.
Definition 1 (Isomorphic embedding of sets of
profiles in feature space in the space of labels).
Let Φ ⊆ P(F ) denote a subset of the powerset of
the feature-value profiles,5 and L denote the set
of labels used by the focal agent for the entities
in the domain. We call σ a distance-preserving
isomorphic embedding of the power set of fea-
ture profiles in the set of labels if the following
5The powerset of a set is the set, P(·) is defined as the
set of all of its subsets. In the case of the set x = {a, b},
P(x) = {∅, {a}, {b}, {a, b}}.
conditions hold:
σ : L 7−→ Φ,
and
∀φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4, l1, l2, l3, l4 [(σ(l1) = φ1)
∧(σ(l2) = φ2) ∧ (σ(l3) = φ3) ∧ (σ(l4) = φ4)
→ (dF (φ1, φ2) = dF (φ3, φ4))
↔ (dL(l1, l2) = dL(l3, l4))].
The second clause ensures that the mapping pre-
serves distance. It states, using formal language,
that if the feature space distance between φ1 and
φ2 is the same as the distance between φ3 and
φ4, the distance between their respective labels
is also the same. This embedded isomorphism
provides the following novel representation of a
schema.
Definition 2 (Schema). An agent’s schema for
a category is the subset of the feature space that
the agent associates with its label (under the
isomorphic embedding): Sch(λ, l, y) ←→ λ =
σ(l, y).
We must add an auxiliary assumption that
the agents engage in schematization along the
lines of the preceeding construction.
Auxiliary assumption 1. The agents in the
audience apply labels to schemas in a way that
corresponds to the isomorphic embedding, σ.
We restrict our analysis to situations in which
the focal agent’s schematization can be repre-
sented by a distance-preserving isomorphic em-
bedding as in Definition 1. Instead of invoking
the predicate Sch(λ, l, y) whenever we introduce
a label in a formula, we use the notational short-
hand that the symbol λy refers to a schematized
label for the agent y.
A schema might be a singleton, but generally
schemas have higher dimensionality. We define
the distance between a point in feature space
and a schema using the standard definition of
the distance between a point and a set: dF (f,λ)
is defined as the minimum of the distances of
the point to each member of the set. When it
comes to the distances between schemas, we need
a distance metric appropriate for sets: Hausdorff
distance. In the case of the schemas λ and λ′,
this metric, denoted as H(λ,λ′), is constructed
as follows. First choose the element in λ that is
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a
b
c
de
f
1
3
2
F L
{a,b}→{1}
{c}→{2}
{d,e}→{3}
Figure 2: Example of an isomorphic embedding of schemas (sets of feature values) and labels.
closest to the set λ′ and record this (minimal)
distance; then calculate the minimal point-to-set
distance from λ′ to λ. The Hausdorff distance
between the sets is the maximum of the two
minimal point-to-set distances.6
It follows from our construction that the dis-
tance between a pair of labels equals the Haus-
dorff distance between the schemas associated
with them under the isomorphic embedding. This
construction yields an implicit definition of dis-
tance in label space as the Hausdorff distances
between the associated schemas.
This defines an agent’s schema, which links
feature profiles with labels. Whether particular
sets of profiles become associated with a label is
another question. Of course, a theoretical model
cannot predict this, because the audience deter-
mines the sets of features that become a label’s
schema. Recent sociological work on classification
6More formally,
H(λ,λ′) ≡
max
{
supv∈λ inf
v′∈λ′
dF (v, v′), supv′∈λ′ inf
v∈λ
dF (v, v′)
}
,
where inf and sup refer to the infimum and supremum,
respectively.
has relied on experts, for example critics or gov-
ernment agencies, to assign objects to a category—
or to provide the category’s extension.7
Our argument does not require external agents
to maintain categorical boundaries. Rather, we
suggest that the link between the spaces builds
on the characteristics of the objects that are al-
ready labeled (those in the category’s extension).
Consider the example in Figure 2. Suppose that
there are three producers and that x1 has the
feature profile a, x2 has b, and x3 has c. Now
suppose that a focal agent applies the tag 1 to
x1, x2, and x3 (so the agent’s extension of this
label consists of these three producers). What
has happened here is that the focal agent has
7Logicians and linguists define concepts in two ways:
extensional and intensional. The extension of a concept
refers to the set of objects that satisfy the concept in
one fixed context. The intension of a concept refers to
its meaning over possibly changing contexts (alternative
possible worlds). The extension of a concept is an actual
set of members; in the intentional view a concept has a
more abstract characterization. For instance, consider
how we would define the concept <prime number>. We
can give its (partial) extension as {3, 5, 7, 11, . . .}. The
standard meaning (or intension) of this concept is “a
natural number greater than one that is divisible only by
one or itself.”
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reacted to the partial membership of x3 in the
agent’s schema for the label and has assigned this
producer membership. Other agents, on learning
of the first agent’s extension, might experience
positive updates in the probability of associating
the feature profile c with the tag 1. So the link be-
tween features and labels emerges endogenously
from the positions of objects in each space. As
objects change features and as label assignments
change, the link between feature space and label
space can also change.
Categorization: Assigning
Labels to Producers
Next we turn to the issue of categorization: the
assignments of labels to objects (producers in our
case). We start by considering the link between
feature space and label space. We then build our
model for the standard view of category statics.
We subsequently extend it to consider category
dynamics.
Consider the producer’s location in feature
space, which we denote by fx. Refer again to
the example in Figure 2. An agent will normally
assign the tag 1 to a producer with feature-value
profile fx = a. But a, as drawn in this figure,
lies one step from b (in the same equivalence
class) and one step from c (not in the class) and
the dF (a, c) is not much greater than dF (a, b).
Producers with the feature profile a plausibly
could be assigned partial memberships in the
categories tagged as 1 and 2. Likewise, the profile
f (which is not associated with a label in this
example) lies one step from c and one step from
e—it stands between the two categories. Perhaps
it will be assigned partial memberships in 2 and
3. So, a producer’s distance from the schema
associated with a concept influences whether it
gets assigned full or partial membership.
Considering partial memberships marks a de-
parture from classical understandings of concepts
and categories. In the so-called classical perspec-
tive, categories are crisp: objects either bear a
label or they do not, and they either fit a schema
or do not.8 For example, every natural number
is either a prime or not, and no prime number
is more prime than any other. But research in
8More precisely, in the classical view, both the exten-
sion and intention of a category are crisp.
cognitive science over the past 35 years has found
that people do not classify social and material
objects in such a crisp fashion. Rather, they
see some objects as having partial memberships,
which means that concepts can have a typical-
ity structure. For example, apples and oranges
are judged as typical <fruit> but tomatoes and
olives are atypical (Rosch and Lloyd 1978). In
the case of markets, an independent business that
serves espresso and sandwiches might be consid-
ered “sort of” or “technically” a <restaurant> but
primarily a <coffee shop>. A software producer
that develops spreadsheets might have partial
membership in <database>.
The notion of a graded membership or typi-
cality refers to the degree to which the focal agent
regards a producer’s feature values as fitting her
schema for the label (or the similarity to the pro-
totype). Producers with feature values close to
the schema/prototype are said to be typical of
that agent’s concept.
In models of categorization, whether a person
applies a label to an object is based on the dis-
tance between her mental representation of the
object and her representation of the respective
concept (e.g., schema or prototype). The higher
an object’s typicality, the higher the probability
that the agent regards it as an instance of the
associated concept (Rosch and Mervis 1975; Tver-
sky and Gati 1978). For example, restaurants
with similar menus get classified alike (Kovács
and Johnson 2014). This means that whether an
object gets assigned a label declines monotoni-
cally with its distance from the schema/prototype.
We propose a simple functional form for this re-
lationship.
Postulate 1. An object’s typicality with respect
to a concept is a negative logistic function of the
distance of its feature profile from the agent’s
schema for the concept label:9
N l, y [(λy 6= ∅)→ ∃! a, b∀x [(a > 0) ∧ (b > 0)
∧(Ty(l, x, y) = (1 + a eb dF (fx,λy))−1 )].
9The model we develop is inspired by Hampton (2007)
and Verheyen et al. (2010) but is adapted to accommodate
an argument about leniency. In particular, Verheyen et al.
(2010) build a Rasch model of categorization to implement
Hampton’s notion of agent-level thresholds, which we
do not include. The negative logistic is more suitable
for our purposes because it has a classic probabilistic
interpretation.
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(In informal language, this postulate states that,
normally, a producer’s typicality to a schema-
tized label l is a negative logistic function of the
distance between the producer’s feature profile
and the audience member’s schema for l. The
formula specifies the existence of the positive con-
stants included in the logistic function and that
the formula holds for all labels and all audience
members in the domain.)
Here and elsewhere, N denotes a nonmono-
tonic quantifier. Formulas quantified in this way
provide formal representations of generic rules
(or rules with possible exceptions). Such rules tell
what is normally the case. The semantics of this
quantifier are spelled out in Pólos and Hannan
(2004). In addition, we use an informal sorting of
variables where l refers to a label, x to an object,
and y to an audience member.
Statics
Postulate 1 has implications for labeling. First we
develop the standard view, which we will call the
static perspective. In this view it is assumed that
both the category schema and the characteristics
of objects do not change. The main question is
how atypical objects are assigned membership in
categories that have fuzzy boundaries.
Fuzziness in category boundaries arises be-
cause agents tend to form different extensions
over occasions. Sometimes they will include an
object in a category’s extension and sometimes
not (for objects with moderate typicality). Recog-
nition of this tendency has led to the use of a
probabilistic notion of categorization. Theory
and research emphasize the probability that an
object sits in the extension of a concept (over
occasions). Let pi(l, x, y) denote the probability
that the agent y currently will apply the label l
to the object x. We propose that this probability
is proportional to x’s typicality for the concept.
Postulate 2. The probability that an agent cat-
egorizes an object as a member of a category is
proportional to its typicality with respect to the
concept:
N l, y [(λy 6= ∅)→ ∃! k ∀x [(k > 0) ∧ (pi(l, x, y)
= k · Ty(l, x, y))].
This small argument implies that an object’s
feature-based distance from the relevant schema
affects how it gets labeled.10
Lemma 1.
P l, y [(λy 6= ∅)→ ∃! a, b, k ∀x [(a > 0)
∧(b > 0) ∧ (k > 0) ∧ (pi(l, x, y) =
k · (1 + a eb dF (fx,λy))−1 )].
Dynamics
Now we turn to dynamics. Here we allow that
both category schemas and object characteristics
can change. To model this, we need to shift from
considering static probabilities of categorization
to the hazards of adding and dropping labels. We
turn to the question of how an object’s typicality,
based on its feature profile, and the changing
properties of the categories affect the dynamics
of labeling, the hazards of adding and dropping
labels. We start by stating a straightforward
extension of the typicality argument.
Postulate 3. An agent’s hazard of newly apply-
ing a label to a producer normally increases with
the typicality of the producer’s profile of feature
values from the schema for the label; and her
hazard of dropping the label decreases with this
typicality:
N l, l′, y ∀x, x′ [(Ty(l, x, y) > Ty(l′, x′, y))→
((l /∈ `x,y) ∧ (l′ /∈ `x′,y)→ γ(l, x, y) >
γ(l′, x′, y)) ∧ ((l ∈ `x,y) ∧ (l′ ∈ `x′,y)→
δ(l, x, y) < δ(l′, x′, y))].
Then it follows that the hazards are deter-
mined by the distance between a feature-value
profile and the applicable schema.
Proposition 1. The hazard of an agent’s newly
applying a label to a producer presumably falls
with the distance of the producer’s profile of fea-
ture values from the agent’s schema; and the haz-
ard of the agent’s dropping the label increases with
10The implications of a set of rules with exceptions
are the logical consequences of a stage of a theory. Such
provisional theorems have a haphazard existence: what
can be derived at one stage might not be derivable in
a later stage. So the status of a provisional theorem
differs from that of a causal story. The syntax of the
language codes this difference. It introduces a “presumably
quantifier, denoted by P. Sentences (formulas) quantified
by P are provisional theorems at a stage of a theory (if
they follow from the premises at that stage).
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this distance:11
P l, l′, y ∀x, x′ [(dF (fx,λl) < dF (fx′ ,λ′l′))→
((l /∈ `x,y) ∧ (l′ /∈ `x′,y)→
γ(l, x, y) > γ(l′, x′, y)) ∧ ((l ∈ `x,y) ∧ (l′ ∈ `x′,y)
→ δ(l, x, y) < δ(l′, x′, y))].
Proof. The rule chain that connects the antecedent
and consequent is a simple cut rule, which carries
over from first-order logic to the nonmonotonic
logic we use. The cut rule holds that φ → ψ
and ψ → χ logically implies φ→ χ. Postulates 1
and 2 imply that typicality declines with distance
from the applicable schema. Our extension of
the static typicality argument to dynamics (pos-
tulate 3) states that higher typically increases
the hazard of adopting a label and decreases the
hazard of dropping a label. This completes the
chain that connects the antecedent and the conse-
quent. The argument does not support a negative
rule chain, a chain whose links run from the an-
tecedent to the negation of the consequent. The
absence of such a rule chain means that the im-
plication stated in the proposition is proven.
For this proposition, we have not assumed
that the schemas for labels remain fixed. Rather,
an agent’s schema is influenced by character-
istics of the objects that currently belong to
the category. This means that schemas change
when members move within each space, and these
changes influence subsequent categorization. Thus
emerges a coupled ecology of market classifica-
tion. Objects can independently change positions
in feature space by changing their characteristics,
or in label space by being reclassified, and this
changes the link between feature space and la-
bel space. Altered category schemas then cause
agents to change other categorizations, possibly
leading to cascades of changes.
Leniency and Categorization
We might also expect that label-space properties
affect labeling. In contexts that lack mechanisms
for boundary enforcement, labels can become
11Note that l and l′ are variables—not names—and we
have not stipulated that l 6= l′. So the proposition applies
when there is a single label in the domain. This becomes
important when we modify the relationship in meaning
postulate 1 below.
porous and have vague boundaries. This might
modify the mapping between the two spaces.
Categories with vague, porous boundaries pro-
liferate in the social world. Scholars who focus
on the cognitive processes underlying categoriza-
tion emphasize that categories organize knowl-
edge and enable humans to structure their reality
(Murphy 2002). But sociologists who study “on-
the-ground” classification have noted that loose
and overlapping categories appear in all types of
classification systems, even those formally con-
structed by authorities, what DiMaggio (1997)
called administrative classification. For example,
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)
retained a number of ill-defined categories for
causes of death, such as <eclampsia>, <convul-
sion>, or <hemorrhage>, to guard against either
having too many unclassified cases or inflating
figures of “badly defined diseases” (Bowker and
Star 2000). From a perspective that stresses the
benefits of concepts in allowing economic and
rapid cognition, such vague concepts might seem
to be pointless and counterproductive. However,
loose concepts exist precisely because classifica-
tion addresses a messy reality.12 Loose concepts
and categories allow classification to incorporate
entities that otherwise would be excluded, with-
out jeopardizing the crispness of other concepts
or categories.
We want to model how vague categories can
affect the ecological dynamic introduced above.
To do this, we need a formal definition of cate-
gories with vague, porous boundaries. We refer to
categories that are close to many other categories
as lenient.13
Lenient categories might not provide a ba-
sis for boundary enforcement. A key intuition
is that lenient categories therefore provide less-
sharp meanings. We argue that this tendency
12An extensive literature in logic, linguistics, and philos-
ophy of science explores the role of vagueness in scientific
and natural languages. See Black (1937), van Demeter
(2010), and the papers collected in Keefe and Smith (1997).
13The language of leniency suggests that observed pat-
terns of overlap reflect constraints, that the differences
among categories in sharpness of boundaries and breadth
of overlap are not accidental. This judgment, of course,
involves an inference. In developing the core argument,
we focus on the descriptive information contained in pat-
terns of overlaps. Once the presentation of the argument
is complete, we show that it implies that the patterns
of overlap generally do reflect constraint (as opposed to
accidental patterns of overlap).
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arises from confusion caused by the similarity
of lenient categories to others. For example, en-
trants into <disk array producer> were already
identified with many other categories, including
<storage subsystems>, <RAID>, and <network-
attached storage>. As a result, the label took
on diffuse and variegated meanings (McKendrick
et al. 2003). In the emergence of the nanotechnol-
ogy field, the label became quite loose due to over-
laps with several scientific disciplines, including
molecular physics, materials science, computer
science, and electrical engineering (Grodal 2011).
The possibility that a welter of categories applies
to some members makes it hard for agents to
interpret these memberships. We develop this
notion in terms of proximities in label space.
Our argument focuses on the distance of a
focal category from the other categories in the
domain, which we call total distance.
Definition 3 (Total distance of a category from
all others in the domain).
D(l, y) =
∑
l′∈L d
L(l, l′)
=
∑
l′∈L d
F (λy,λ
′
y) =
∑
l′∈LH(λy,λ
′
y).
Lenient categories have low values of D. We
do not suggest that any difference in leniency will
be consequential. Rather, we propose that there
is a threshold over which multiple overlaps make
a category difficult for agents to interpret. The
following meaning postulate formalizes this idea
and provides an indirect definition of leniency.
Meaning postulate 1. If one category is much
more lenient than another, then it normally is
less distant from other categories in the domain:14
N l, l′, y ∃w [(w > 0) ∧ (len(l, y)−
len(l′, y) > w)→ D(l, y) < D(l′, y)].
The relationship just postulated can hold for
many values of w. We identify (and name as
w∗) the minimum value for which the relation-
ship holds:
w∗ = inf{w | (w > 0) ∧N l, l′, y [(len(l, y)−
len(l′, y) > w)→ D(l, y) < D(l′, y)}.
14In the nonmonotonic logic we use, postulates can
be strict (that is, first-order rules without exceptions)
or generic statements that hold in normal situations,
rules with possible exceptions—see the supplementary
appendix.
We suggest that leniency affects the link be-
tween feature-space positions and labeling. This
is because categories do not exist in isolation.
The vast research literature on concepts builds
on the notion that categories play the cognitive
role of grouping similar items and differentiat-
ing different items. Categorization concerns not
only the match between an object and an agent’s
schema for one category but also the difference of
the object from the agent’s schemas for other cat-
egories. A metaphor can be seen in the concept of
cue validity, which characterizes the diagnosticity
of a feature value for membership in a particular
category. Cue validity is based on both how much
a feature is associated with a focal category and
how little it is associated with others (Rosch and
Lloyd 1978). Analogously, an object’s fit to a
schema is more diagnostic of membership if the
schemas for other categories are not proximate.
Central to our argument is that having high
proximity to many categories distorts perceptions
of categorization based on feature values. To de-
velop this formally, we first define, for producer-
category pairs, the feature-space proximity be-
tween a focal producer and other producers as-
signed labels of all categories other than a focal
category.
Definition 4 (Overall proximity to other-labeled
objects at the producer level).
P (l, x, y) = [
∑
l′ 6=l
∑
l′∈`(x′,y) d
F (fx, fx′)]
−1.
We then need to modify the standard assump-
tion about how agents categorize (see Postu-
late 1). Specifically, we propose that high overall
proximity weakens an object’s fit to categorical
schemas.15
Postulate 4. When the domain contains multi-
ple labels, the typicality of a producer is a decreas-
ing function of its proximity to the members of
other categories in the domain and a decreasing
function of its distance from the schema for the
focal category:
N l, y [(NL,y > 1) ∧ (λl 6= ∅)→
∃!α, β ∀x [(α > 0) ∧ (β > 0) ∧ (Ty(l, x, y)
= (1 + eαP (l,x,y)eβ d
F (fx,λl))−1 )],
15In introducing this consideration, we introduce a speci-
ficity consideration: that the postulate that follows holds
only when the domain contains more than one label. In
the following we use specificity considerations to manage
the inconsistency between the two indirect definitions of
typicality.
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where NL,y denotes the number of domain labels
that the agent has schematized.
The typicality function in postulate 4 ap-
proaches the function given in postulate 1 as
P ↓ 0. As P increases, typicality falls toward
zero. This means that the higher an object’s
proximity to other categories, the weaker is the
effect of its distance from the schema on typical-
ity. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of increasing
proximity in terms of this function. The upper
(solid) curve plots µ = (1 + 0.02e2d)−1, and the
lower (dashed) changes the value of the multi-
plier of the exponential term from 0.02 to 0.05,
reflecting a much higher value of overall proxim-
ity. For the solid curve, where the producer has
low proximity to members of other categories,
an object at close distance to the schema results
in a high expected typicality. For the dashed
curve, where the producer has high proximity to
members of other categories, an object at the
same distance from the schema will have a lower
expected typicality.
While the co-presence of postulates 1 and 4
in the theory would create an inconsistency in
first-order logic, this need not be so for nonmono-
tonic logic. We resolve this potential conflict by
relying on the most characteristic feature of non-
monotonic logic that more specific rules override
less specific ones. By restricting the postulate to
cases in which a domain contains more than one
label, we have made postulate 4 more specific
than postulate 1. This more specific relationship
overrules the less specific one in the analysis of
multilabel domains.
Next we tie the argument about labeling to
leniency. The first step is to define producer’s
closest category. It simplifies the analysis greatly,
without distorting the intuition, to assume that
the closest category is unique for each producer.
Definition 5 (Closest category).
cl(l, x, y)↔ ∀l′ [(l′ ∈ L)→
d(fx,λ
′
y) > d(fx,λy)].
Next we need to tie producer-level arguments
to the category-level ones. We do so by consider-
ing pairs of producers that are alike in one impor-
tant respect: the distance of their feature-value
profile to the schema of their closest categories is
the same. In other words, we consider pairs who
fit the most applicable (best-fitting) schema to
the same degree. But the pairs also differ in an
important respect: their closest categories differ
in total distance to other categories.
Postulate 5. Producers that are proximate to
the schemas of categories that lie closer to other
categories in the domain normally have higher
total proximity to the members of all other cate-
gories in the domain (holding constant the degree
of fit to the schema for the closest category):
N l, l′, y ∀x, x′ [(D(l, y) < D(l′, y) ∧ cl(l, x, y)
∧cl(l′, x′, y) ∧ (d(fx,λy) = d(fx′ ,λ′y))
→ P (l, x, y) > P (l′, x′, y)].
Together, postulates 4 and 5 imply that producers
that are close in feature space to a lenient label
are seen as less typical of that label, as compared
to producers who are equally proximate to a
constraining one.
Lemma 2. If two producers are equally close
to the schemas for their closest categories and
the closest category for one is sufficiently more
lenient than the closest category for the other,
then the producer with the more lenient closest
category presumably has lower typicality in its
closest category than does the other producer:
P l, l′, y ∀x, x′ [(len(l, y)− len(l′, y) > w∗)
∧cl(l, x, y) ∧ cl(l′, x′, y) ∧ (d(fx,λy) =
d(fx′ ,λ
′
y))→ Ty(l, x, y) < Ty(l′, x′, y)].
Proof. The antecedent requires that the domain
contains more than one label because it refers
to a pair of labels that are applied to a pair of
producers such that each bears one label but not
the other. This means that specificity consider-
ations dictate that the proximity-weighted typi-
cality function (from postulate 4) applies. Given
that the antecedent specifies that the produc-
ers’ feature profiles stand at equal distance from
the applicable schemas, any differences in typi-
calities depends only on the difference in total
proximities for the producers. The antecedent
also tells that the difference in the leniencies of
the applied categories exceeds w∗, which means
that postulate 5 implies that the producer close
to the lenient label has higher total proximity
to the members of other categories. Inserting
this inequality in proximities into the proximity-
weighted typicality function completes the chain
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Figure 3: Two illustrative membership functions showing the effect of a difference in proximity on the
relationship between distance from a category schema/prototype and the probability of labeling; see
text.
linking the antecedent and consequent. In the
absence of any opposing rule change given the
premise set, this completes the proof.
It follows that the link between a producer’s
proximity to a label and categorization is stronger
for constraining labels and weaker for lenient
labels.
Proposition 2. Agents have higher hazards of
adding and lower hazards of (newly) dropping the
label of a producer’s closest category when it is
constraining as compared to when it is sufficiently
more lenient:
P l, l′, y ∀x, x′ [(len(l, y)− len(l′, y) > w∗)
∧cl(l, x, y) ∧ cl(l′, x′, y) ∧ (dF (fx, l)
= dF (fx′ , l
′)) ∧ ((l /∈ `(x)) ∧ (l′ /∈ `(x′, y))
→ γ(l, x, y) < γ(l′, x′, y)) ∧ ((l ∈ `(x, y))
∧(l′ ∈ `(x′, y))→ δ(l, x, y) > δ(l′, x′, y))].
Proof. The rule chain supporting lemma 2 en-
tails a difference in typicalities for the pair of
producers. A chain rule with the extension of
the standard typicality argument to the dynamic
situation, postulate 3, provides a positive rule
chain linking the antecedent and consequent. The
theory as stated does not give rise to any negative
rule chains that imply a different conclusion (a dif-
ferent ordering of the hazards of dropping labels).
Thus the nonmonotonic proof is complete.
The argument that supports proposition 2
holds that a category’s structural position in
label space affects how strongly it is linked to
feature space. Specifically, the relationship be-
tween feature-space positions and labeling weak-
ens when labels are lenient. This provides a
theoretical basis for predicting loose coupling of
feature values and label assignments.
Perhaps the most interesting implication of
this argument concerns the trajectories of le-
niency and constraint in classification. Our ar-
gument suggests that lenient categories become
more lenient: agents are less likely to take into
account feature-based similarities when applying
lenient labels, which can lead to a diverse set
of agents being assigned a lenient label. This
will increase the proximity of its members to the
memberships of other categories, which will fuel
the cycle. This pattern does not hold for mem-
bers of much more constraining categories. The
“Discussion” section sketches the argument (for
a fixed set of categories) that lenient categories
remain lenient and highly constraining categories
remain constraining.16
A Context: Market Classifica-
tion in the Software Industry
We investigate this model in the empirical set-
ting of the software industry. In the software
16We add the qualification to fixed sets of categories
because new categories might deviate from the pattern.
sociological science | www.sociologicalscience.com 323 August 2014 | Volume 1
Pontikes and Hannan An Ecology of Social Categories
industry, an informal classification of product
markets has emerged through interaction among
producers, analysts, the media, and consumers.
It depends heavily on producer affiliation with
market categories. Consumers, employees, and
investors use category labels to find producers,
products, and services, as well as to stay abreast
of innovations. Organizations identify with la-
bels primarily to communicate what they offer to
various audiences.
In making the shift to a specific context, we
also shift from a single agent to a collective, an
audience. This is because we relate labeling ac-
tions by a focal firm to similar decisions by others.
These analyses depend on an assumption that
the language is common within the audience, oth-
erwise it would be feckless to search for the kinds
of effects our theory yields. The degree to which
this assumption characterizes audiences of inter-
est is an interesting and important topic in its
own right (Pontikes 2012; Koçak et al. 2014). But
we do not address it here. What is important
is that the audience investigated, software pro-
ducers, uses a common system of classification to
make sense of the domain.
We represent label space based on affiliations
with market categories made by software pro-
ducers in press releases. Press releases are an
important medium for an organization to convey
what it does. Software organizations use press
releases to distribute news and create a public
face for media analysts, investors, and consumers.
The major stock exchanges in the United States
suggest or require that companies issue press re-
leases to distribute information. Media often note
press releases in their coverage: a study of public
companies finds an average of 1.5 (median 1.3)
media articles per press release issued from 2001
to 2006 (Soltes 2009). Product classification is
based on attributes of a company’s product or
service, so labels in this context are verifiable by
consumers or analysts. As a result, it is important
for organizations to describe their activities ac-
curately. Because press releases can be produced
at low cost, even small and young organizations
(which are difficult to track otherwise) issue them.
For these reasons, press releases provide a good
source of data to construct label space in this
domain.
Software producers use category labels to de-
scribe themselves in press releases. For exam-
ple, MicroStrategy identified itself in 1995 as “a
leading supplier of client/server decision support
tools,” thereby affiliating with two category la-
bels. The <client/server> label indicates that
MicroStrategy’s software would run on multiple
client machines that communicated through a
server. The <decision support> label conveys
that the software provides reports that combine
data from a number of sources to identify and
solve problems and support business decisions
(Figure 4 lists other examples of label affiliations
from press releases in these data). In this context,
producers typically develop a suite of software
products targeted at one or more market cate-
gories, and the category affiliation is at the level
of the organization.
We investigated whether labels claimed in
press releases were also used by other impor-
tant audiences. We found that the preeminent
industry-analyst organization, Gartner, issued re-
ports on over 50 percent of labels extracted from
press releases, showing that press releases cap-
ture a common language for classification among
audiences in this domain. Of the labels used in
both press releases and in Gartner reports, over
75 percent appeared first in press releases.
We also investigated whether affiliations in
press releases target a specific audience or whether
they reflect the general identity of the organiza-
tion. This question is especially important be-
cause different audiences can have different pref-
erences regarding classification (Pontikes 2012).
We compared claims claimed in press releases
and company websites from the same time period
(recorded in the archived web) and those claimed
in annual reports (10-K forms) for public com-
panies. Organizations identified with the same
labels in press releases and on websites 71 percent
of the time and in 10-K forms 81 percent of the
time. This indicates that label assignments from
press releases reflect an organization’s general
market identity.
This classification contains both lenient and
constraining categories. Constraining categories
evoke specific expectations. For example, <enter-
tainment software> refers to producers of video
game software. This category has a trade associa-
tion, the Entertainment Software Association (or
ESA), that tracks membership and promotes the
interests of members, such as lobbying the gov-
ernment on issues like video game ratings. This
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Figure 4: Sample press release identity statements with category affiliations.
category has very low overlap with others. Com-
panies that produce other types of software for
entertainment—such as digital video or audio—
do not affiliate with this label. Lenient categories
broadly overlap with many other categories, and
their meaning is a frequent source of discussion
among industry insiders. For example, industry
analyst James Kobielus of Forrester Research de-
scribes in a blog post titled “What’s Not BI?” how
audience members struggle to struggle to derive
meaning from the lenient <business intelligence
(BI)> category:
One of the favorite pastimes of BI an-
alysts everywhere . . . is defining and
redefining this uber-category known
as BI. What exactly is it? Or rather—
considering that almost every data
management technology has been swept
into BI’s gravitational orbit at one
time or another by somebody somewhere—
what is BI not? What’s analytics?
What are decision support systems?
(Kobielus 2010)
Lenient labels are vague and have porous bound-
aries, but they are not necessarily marginal or de-
clining in importance. In many cases, they grow
large and become prominent. For example, the le-
nient <customer relationship management> label
received 149 mentions in the Wall Street Journal
from its first appearance in 1998 though 2008.
But <electronic design automation>, a promi-
nent constraining label, was mentioned only 33
times from its first appearance in 1988 through
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2002 (its last mention). Some of the most impor-
tant categories in this classification are lenient.
Our model requires that label space only in-
clude labels at the same hierarchical level. Labels
analyzed should not be supercategories or sub-
categories of one another. This condition holds
for the labels included in this analysis. Lenient
categories included in this analysis are not su-
perordinate categories. In a hierarchy, a super-
ordinate category sits above all subcategories in
a tree, such that if an organization belongs to a
subcategory, it also belongs to the supercategory.
This type of hierarchical relationship is uncom-
mon in our empirical context, as is often the case
for informal classification. For example, the ex-
tension of <business intelligence> overlaps with
that of <sales-force automation>, but not all
<sales force automation> members are labeled as
<business intelligence>. Furthermore, some or-
ganizations only affiliate with lenient categories.
Lenient categories overlap broadly, sometimes
with more than 100 other categories; but the
categories they overlap with are not nested.
Data and Methods
Label Space
Testing these propositions requires data on label
assignments. We use data complied by Pontikes
(2008) based on identity statements in press re-
leases issued by software organizations (for exam-
ples, see Figure 4). This identifies times at which
organizations adopt new labels and drop existing
labels.
A compilation of press releases issued between
1990 and 2002 in Businesswire, PR Newswire, and
Computerwire with at least three mentions of the
word “software” served as the initial source of
data: 268,963 press releases. A combination of
custom-coded programs for text matching and
visual examination of the outputs of these pro-
grams yielded records for 4,566 software organiza-
tions that issued press releases during this period.
The identity statements made by these organi-
zations indicate category membership. Pontikes
(2008) assembled an extensive list of software
labels from articles in Software Magazine and
Computerworld and from inspection of the firms’
identity statements, and used text-matching pro-
grams to search all identity statements for these
labels. This created a file of organizations’ la-
bels for each year during 1990–2002. The final
data contain information on 456 labels and 4,566
organizations over 18,192 organization-years.
Feature Space
Our empirical analysis positions organizations in
a feature space based on technical capabilities,
which we call knowledge space. This space is a
subset of all feature values that characterize orga-
nizations. We use patents to represent knowledge
space. Patents do not capture the complete set
of relevant features in this domain, but patented
technology reflects an important subset of innova-
tive activity among software producers. Patents
have been widely used in previous research to
identify an organization’s technological position
and to measure relative similarities in a techni-
cal space (Jaffe 1986 1989; Podolny et al. 1996;
Stuart and Podolny 1996; Sørensen and Stuart
2000).
Technological innovation has been at the heart
of the software industry’s growth, and a fair
amount of inventive activity can be traced through
patents. Patents influence venture-capital financ-
ing, IPOs, and successful acquisition (Mann and
Sager 2007; Cockburn and MacGarvie 2009). Even
small organizations patent, hoping to exclude
competitors (Mann 2005). Despite controversy
about the relevance of patents in the software
industry, a sizable number of software organiza-
tions received patents (20 percent in the press
release data).17
Patents provide a good basis to measure posi-
tions in a technological feature space, for several
reasons. First, they reflect an organization’s tech-
nical capabilities. Second, a independent party
verifies them. Third, the patenting process is
very weakly influenced (if at all) by an organi-
17Patents have been controversial in software.
Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972 ruled that software pro-
grams were algorithms that could not be patented. How-
ever, this decision was mostly overturned in Diamond
v. Diehr in 1981, which found that a software program
could be patented if it was embedded within an appara-
tus. After a series of cases that increasingly supported
the patentability of software, a 1995 ruling essentially
reversed Gottschalk, and the last barrier to patenting
pure software was overturned in 1998. Despite this, the
approval of software patents was a routine practice long
before the courts recognized it (Cohen and Lemley 2001;
Cockburn and MacGarvie 2009; Mann 2005).
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zation’s product-market categorization. In this
context, market categories are only loosely based
on technologies. For example, <collaboration
software> combines technologies based on video,
GUI (graphical user interface), and mathematical
algorithms. Feature-space data based on product
evaluations by industry analysts would be much
more likely to be influenced by how the orga-
nization positioned itself using product-market
classification (not to mention that these data are
not systematically available). A knowledge space
based on patents captures a critical subset of
feature space for this domain that can be mea-
sured independently from label space. Through
citations, patents provide a historical record of
knowledge-space positions and proximities.
The downside to using patents is that not all
software organizations patent. We conduct our
main analyses on the subset of organizations that
are active in knowledge space (those that have
previously patented). The press release data con-
tain 789 organizations with at least one patent
across 4,012 organization-years. We run addi-
tional analyses on all organizations in the press
release data, coding those that are not active in
knowledge space (those without patents) as hav-
ing zero knowledge-space proximity to all labels.
The results are consistent across both analyses.
Patent citations come from the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research patent-data project
(Hall et al. 2001). Data were updated to include
patents through 2002.18 The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office issues patents for new, unique,
and nonobvious inventions. All patents must cite
the relevant “prior art” on which their invention
builds, and the prior-art citations indicate the
knowledge foundation for the patent at hand.
Two patents that cite the same patent as prior
art are more similar in knowledge space than
pairs that lack common citations.
The patent office requires that inventors’ claims
be focused and narrow. Inventors must cite any
relevant patents of which they are aware, and the
patent examiner can also add citations to ensure
comprehensive citation to prior art (Alcácer and
Gittleman 2006). For some studies, it is impor-
tant that the citations to prior art accurately
18The data updates can be found at http://elsa.
berkeley.edu/~bhhall/patents.html. Data were first
updated through 2002, then through 2006. This research
uses the 2002 update.
reflect the inventor’s knowledge; and citations
added by the examiner are problematic. This
does not pose a problem for our study, because
we use patents to locate organizations in a knowl-
edge space. Citations added by an examiner help
refine the patents’ positions.
Patent officers assign patents to a main class
and one or more subclasses. There are about
400 classes. The National Bureau of Economic
Research has created a higher-level classification
system of six classes: Chemical, Computers and
Communications, Drugs and Medical, Electrical
and Electronics, and Other (Hall et al. 2001).
This study uses all patents granted in the Com-
puters and Communications class between the
years 1990 and 2002 to construct knowledge space
for the software industry. This broad class in-
cludes patents relevant to software.
Following Pontikes (2008), we construct knowl-
edge space using a five-year window of all patents
in the Computers and Communications class. We
use all patents relevant to software, including
those issued to software organizations, individual
inventors, universities, and nonsoftware organiza-
tions over a moving five-year window, including
patents that were applied for (that were subse-
quently granted) in the current year and four
years prior.
Independent Variables
Here we provide the details about the measure-
ment of the two key explanatory variables.
Leniency. To represent leniency, we need to mea-
sure the proximities among categories in the do-
main. We adopt Pontikes’s (2008) measure, which
uses category overlaps in label space to indicate
similarity between categories. A category is more
similar to another in label space if many of its
members also belong to the other category.
Leniency is the product of contrast and a pos-
itive function of the number of categories with
which the focal category overlaps. Contrast is
the average label-based typicality of its members.
It measures the extent to which a label com-
prises typical or atypical members (Hannan et al.
2007).19 To measure contrast, we first must com-
pute label-based typicalities, ϑ(l, x, y) from label
19It is important to incorporate contrast into the mea-
sure of leniency. Otherwise the membership of a few
members would have outsized influence. For example, a
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assignments. We assume that an object that is as-
signed to multiple categories is less typical of each
and that this diminution is exacerbated when the
categories lie far apart in the label space. For
example, an establishment that is both a French
restaurant and a car wash would be very atypical
of each label.
In accordance with our theory, we take into
account producers’ partial affiliations with labels.
What we call label-profile typicality, denoted by
ϑ(l, x, y), is based on (1) the number of times a
producer affiliates with a focal category in a given
time period, compared to the number of times it
affiliates with other categories, and (2) whether
a producer is a member of multiple similar or
multiple distant categories. The more a producer
affiliates with a focal category, the higher its label-
profile typicality. The less it affiliates with other
categories—especially other dissimilar categories,
the higher is its typicality in the focal category.
Label-profile typicality ranges over [0, 1]. This
construction follows Kovács and Hannan (2011)
but uses a generalization that builds on Pontikes
(2008). The first step calculates the similarities of
all pairs of categories, in notation simL(l, l′, u),
based on how many organizations are assigned
membership in both categories in the time inter-
val u. The second step uses a Shepard (1987)
construction to calculate distance between a pair
of categories based on label profiles, in notation,
d˜L(l, l
′, u), as a Euclidean distance, as follows:
N y, u∃h [(h > 0) ∧ ∀ l, l′,
t [(simL(l, l′, u) = e−h d˜
L(l,l′,u)]].
(1)
We use measured similarities (based on co-occur-
rence) and a setting for the parameter h to obtain
dL. After experimentation with values for h rang-
ing over the integers from 1 to 5, we found that
similar patterns of effects of theoretically relevant
variables (significance levels do vary, however).
We set h = 3, which provides the best overall
model fit.
The next step calculates typicality, ϑ(l, x, u),
from label profiles using the idea that a producer’s
typicality in applied categories declines with the
application of each new label, and the decline is
greater when the newly added label lies far from
the already applied categories. We calculate label
label with a hundred typical members and one member
with broad overlap would appear as lenient.
profiles by taking into account that firms often
release multiple press releases at multiple times
during a year, and each provides information on
labeling. Rather than only including whether a
firm claims a label in a given time period, we
weight the relative frequency of claims to each
label. For example, if an organization claims
label A in one press release and B in three press
releases in the same year, for a total number of
4 label mentions, then we calculate l(A, x)=1/4
and l(B, x)=3/4. We calculate ϑ as follows:20
ϑ(l, x, u) =
`(l,x,u)
`(l,x,u)+
∑
l′∈L `(l′,x,u)·d˜L(l,l′,u)
. (2)
A label’s contrast is the average label-based typi-
cality of its members:21
C(l, u) =
∑
x:ϑ(l,x,u)>0 ϑ(l, x, u)
|{x : ϑ(l, x, u) > 0}| . (3)
We calculate leniency as the product of inverse
contrast and a positive function of the number of
categories overlapped:
len(l, u) = (1− C(l, u)) · ψ(nl,u)
= (1− C(l, u)) · ln(∑l′ d˜L(l, l′, u)), (4)
where nl,u denotes the number of other categories
whose memberships overlap with l. The function
ψ(nl,u) is computed based on a summation of the
distance between l and each label l′ with which
it overlaps. We use a log transform because the
interpretability of a label ought to drop more
sharply when the number of overlaps rises in the
lower range than at higher levels. Our decision
to weight the number of categories overlapped by
their distances from the focal label follows the
spirit of the construction of ϑ, namely, that com-
bining dissimilar categories causes a greater loss
in distinctiveness than combining similar ones.
We separate leniency into two pieces, instead
of using the continuous measure, because the
key propositions depend on one label being suffi-
ciently more lenient than another. We break the
distribution of leniency at 2.7, the approximate
mid-point of the leniency of producers’ labels,
20Kovács and Hannan (2011) treat `(l, x, u) as a
dummy variable; Pontikes (2008) implicitly assumes all
d˜L(l, l′, u) = 1.
21We use the standard notation | · | to denote the cardi-
nality of a set, the number of distinct elements.
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and treat high (low) leniency as values above
(below) the breakpoint.
Producer’s proximity to labels in knowledge space.
The other main variable to be defined is the prox-
imity (inverse distance) of a producer’s position
in knowledge space from a label. Recall that
we assume that the hazards of adding and drop-
ping labels are negative exponential functions of
the distance of an object’s position in feature
space from the schema for the label (Postulate 4).
We lack knowledge of schemas. So we proceed
indirectly by measuring a label’s position in fea-
ture space in terms of the set of positions of the
objects that lie in the label’s extension. Then
we measure an object’s position in feature space
relative to the label’s extension.
We measure positions in knowledge space us-
ing their patents’ prior art citations. Patents
that share citations build on similar knowledge.
Therefore we use citation overlaps to position
patents relative to one another in knowledge space
(Podolny et al. 1996). We use the patent citation
network of all patents in the Computers and Com-
munications class (Hall et al. 2001). We measure
similarity from prior-art citations (Podolny et al.
1996; Podolny and Stuart 1995). The similarity
of patent i to patent j, αij , is defined as sij/si,
where sij denotes the number of shared citations
between patents i and j, and si denotes the total
number of citations by patent i.22 We can cap-
ture more fine-grained detail by also considering
22We have the choice of whether to use asymmetric
or symmetric measures of similarity. With asymmetric
similarities, patent i can be more similar to patent j than j
is to i. Some research in cognitive psychology supports the
use of asymmetric similarities. Studies show that people’s
assessments of similarity is asymmetric across a number
of domains (countries, figures, letters, signals) (Tversky
1977). Competition can also be asymmetric, for example,
a specialist competes more strongly with a generalist than
vice versa; because of this asymmetric measures have
previously been used to define technological niches among
firms using patent citation data (Stuart and Podolny
1996). There are also reasons to use symmetric similarities
(defined as the number of overlapping citations divided
by the number of citations made by both i and j: αij =
sij/sisj). Symmetric similarities translate into symmetric
distances in feature space, which means that distances
between two points in feature space will not depend on
directionality. This is an important property for our
formal model of feature space and label space. The choice
does not materially affect our results. Weighing these
options, we chose to use asymmetric patent similarities
in our primary analysis to comport with standards of
existing empirical research.
second-degree similarity, which takes into account
whether a patent stands within two degrees of sep-
aration from another patent. This brings into the
picture common dependence on relevant patents
that were issued to nonsoftware organizations
such as universities. We compute second-degree
similarity between of patent i to k by multiply-
ing their similarities to all third patents, j, and
choosing the j that maximizes the similarity of i
and k: ρik = maxj|j 6=i,j 6=k(αij · αjk).
The degree to which interested agents regard
a patent as tied to a label presumably depends
on how strongly the organization that issued the
patent is affiliated with the label. If the inventor
firm has a low level of typicality in a label, its
patents should similarly be considered only par-
tially representative of the label. To reflect this
view, we define a patent’s typicality in a label
as equal to the label-based typicality in l of the
firm to which the patent was issued, in notation
ψ(l, i, u) = ϑ(l, x, u) I(i, x, u), where I(i, x, u) is
an indicator variable equal to one if patent i is a
member of the set of organization x’s patents (in
notation pxu) and equal to zero otherwise. The
proximity (inverse distance) of an organization’s
position in feature space to a label, p(l, x, u), is
p(l, x, u) =∑
i∈pxu
∑
j|(j /∈pxu) ρij · ψ(l, j, u)
|pxu| ,
(5)
where the second summation is restricted to the
patents affiliated with the label l. We also use
Equation 5 to calculate the proximity (inverse
distance) of a producer’s position to all labels that
it currently claims, pC(x, u), and to all labels it
currently does not claim, pNC(x, u) (to be used
as control variables). Because of skew in the
distribution of the distances, we use (natural)
logarithmic transformations of these variables in
our empirical analysis.23
23The distance between an organization’s patents and
the patents associated with a category is a distance be-
tween two sets. As such, it might seem that we should use
the Hausdorff distance, which we employ in our formal
theory for distances between schemas. However, in this
case, an organization can belong to multiple categories, so
its set of patents can include those that are not relevant to
category i, but are relevant to a category j. In this case,
the Hausdorff distance would only consider the patent
that was farthest from the set of patents associated with a
category, which often will refer to a patent that is relevant
to a different category.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Tests Involving the Hazard of Adding a Label. (N = 1, 434, 096)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Org. adds a label 0.004 0.060 0 1
K-space prox. to focal label 0.006 0.045 0 2.543
K-space prox. to const. focal label 0.004 0.038 0 2.543
K-space prox. to len. focal label 0.002 0.024 0 2.073
K-space prox. to other labels org. not claimed 0.745 0.934 0 4.003
K-space prox. to labels org. claims 0.105 0.251 0 2.462
A producer’s distance from a label’s feature
profile can change in three ways: (1) it can move
away from a stationary profile, (2) other produc-
ers can move while the focal producer remains
in place, or (3) both the focal producer and the
other profile members move but in different direc-
tions. To explore this in supplementary analyses,
we also create a measure of an organization’s sta-
tionarity in knowledge space based on citation
overlap between the organization’s patents in the
current year and its patents in the previous four
years.
Controls
Social factors, such as whether a category is
resource-rich or otherwise popular, can also affect
label adoption. People and organizations some-
times engage in herding behavior, where high
levels of adoption in one period lead to increased
rates of adoption in the next period (Strang and
Soule 1998). This effect can result either because
agents follow each other’s actions, as in the case of
fads (Lieberson 2000; Meyersohn and Katz 1957),
or because the number of organizations in a cate-
gory signals an unmeasured factor, for example
demand for a specific product. To account for
these effects, we include the label’s fuzzy density
(the number of organizations that are members
of the label weighted by typicality) to control for
the label’s size in the previous period. The rate
at which a label is catching on can also affect
adoption patterns (Berger and Le Mens 2009).
Therefore we also control for the number of new
affiliations with the label and number of drops in
the previous period, both weighted by typicality.
We also include controls for the leniency of the
label and tenure of the label measured since the
beginning of our records, 1990.
Organization-level controls include the num-
ber of labels in which it has nonzero membership,
the number of other labels in the industry, the
count of its patents (to account for general inven-
tive activity), and the time since the organization
has last added or dropped any label. Venture
capitalist investors may influence an organiza-
tion to add or drop market categories (Pontikes
2012). Therefore we also control for whether the
organization has recently received venture capital
financing. Because old and large organizations
might not pay as much attention to feature-based
fit, perhaps because they receive less scrutiny,
we control for the organization’s tenure in our
data, to account for age, and for whether it was
ranked in Software Magazine’s top 500 software
companies (based on revenue) to account for size.
To test whether there is a systematic relationship
with knowledge-space proximity to a label, we
also estimated specifications that include interac-
tions between these variables and proximity.24
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics
for the independent variables in our analysis.
Dependent Variables
We analyze events of adding and dropping labels
in continuous time. We code adding a label as
occurring in the first year in which an organi-
zation lists that label in press releases, and the
dropping of a label as occurring in the last year
an organization lists it (if the observation is not
right-censored at that time).25 Seventy percent
24These interaction effects are not significant, indicating
that there is not a detectable difference in the influence
of feature similarities on label assignments based on orga-
nization age or size. Importantly, the key effects persist.
25Label claims from the initial year an organization
appears in press releases are not counted as an add, and
claims from the final year are not counted as a drop.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Tests Involving the Hazard of Dropping a Label. (N = 10, 908)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Org. drops a label 0.403 0.491 0 1
K-space prox. to focal label 0.047 0.144 0 2.499
K-space prox. to const. focal label 0.024 0.106 0 2.499
K-space prox. to len. focal label 0.022 0.104 0 1.818
K-space prox. to labels org. is not claimed 0.915 0.965 0 4.003
K-space prox. to other labels org. claims 0.731 0.928 0 4.014
of organizations add and drop at least one label
during the time period studied. Ninety-five per-
cent of patenting organizations add and drop at
least one label. Twenty percent of all organiza-
tions and 45 percent of patenting organizations
add more than five labels. Twenty percent of all
organizations and 40 percent of patenting organi-
zations drop more than five labels.
Stochastic Specifications
and Estimation
We test these hypotheses using event-history anal-
ysis. We estimate the effects of proximity and
leniency on the hazards with standard piecewise-
constant specifications. We updated covariates
for each time piece. In both forms of analysis,
pieces are defined for less than one year, [1–2)
years, [2–4) years, and 4 years or greater. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by label.
Adding labels. In analyses of the hazard of adding
a label, the risk set consists of all dyads of an
organization that has previously patented and
one of the labels with which it is does not affili-
ate. There are 337,800 organization-label dyads
over 1,434,096 organization-label-years, and 5,266
events of adding a label. We also conduct addi-
tional analyses using data including all organi-
zations in the press release data, whether they
patent or not. In this case, we assign nonpaten-
ters knowledge-proximity scores of zero for all
labels. This larger data set contains 1,893,569
organization-label dyads over 6,485,521 or-
ganization-label-years and 15,103 events of adding
a label. Dyads enter the model in the first year
the organization or label enters the data (which-
ever comes later). Duration is the time since the
organization-label dyad exists in these data.
Dropping labels. In analyses of the hazard of drop-
ping a label, the risk set contains all dyads of an
organization that has previously patented and
their labels: 5,967 dyads over 10,908 years, with
4,397 events of dropping a label. Again we also
included the nonpatenters in additional analyses;
the entire data set contains 21,589 organization-
label dyads over 39,359 organization-label-years,
with 13,880 events of dropping a label. We an-
alyze spells during the years 1990–2001. Dyads
enter the risk set in the first year the organiza-
tion affiliates with the label. Duration is the time
elapsed since the organization first affiliates with
the label.
Hypotheses
We test four hypotheses in this empirical con-
text based on our theoretical propositions. The
first and second hypotheses concern the relation-
ship between feature-space positions and label
affiliations (prop. 1).
Hypothesis 1. A producer’s hazard of adding
a label increases with its proximity in knowledge
space to the cluster of producers associated with
the label.
Hypothesis 2. A producer’s hazard of dropping
a label decreases with its proximity in knowledge
space to the cluster of producers associated with
the label.
The third and fourth hypotheses concern the
effects of leniency (prop. 2).
Hypothesis 3. Proximity in knowledge space
to the producers associated with a constraining
label has a stronger positive effect on the hazard
of adding that label than does proximity to a
more lenient label.
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Hypothesis 4. Proximity in knowledge space
to the producers associated with a constraining
label has a stronger negative effect on the hazard
of dropping that label than does proximity to a
more lenient label.
Results
Adding Labels
We analyze the effects of knowledge space prox-
imity on the hazards of adding a label. Table
3 reports estimations on the hazard of adding a
label for the independent variables in the analy-
sis (all estimations include controls; full models
available upon request). The first model in Ta-
ble 3 reports tests of H1. This analysis considers
dyads of organizations that have patented and
the labels that they do not already claim. The
results support H1: an organization’s knowledge-
space proximity to a label has a positive effect
on the hazard of it adopting this label (p < 0.01
in a z-score test). An organization that is two
standard deviations above the mean on proxim-
ity to a label is 10 percent more likely to adopt
the label, as compared to one at mean proximity,
according to this estimate.
Next we analyze whether the effects of prox-
imity depend on leniency. The second model of
Table 3 provides tests of H3. The results support
this hypothesis: proximity to a constraining la-
bel has a strong positive effect on the hazard of
adding it (z-score test significant at p < 0.01).
However, the effect of proximity is smaller and
insignificant when the proximate label is lenient.
This specification fits better than the one in
model 1 (the likelihood-ratio test is significant
at p < 0.01). This indicates that feature values
matter less for affiliation with lenient labels.
We also explored some possible confounding
effects. One question might be whether proximity
drives the effect, or whether it just reflects the
consequences of general exploration in the space.
To test against this alternative, we include an ef-
fect of the organization’s proximities to all other
labels it does not affiliate with, and to all other
labels it does affiliate with (model 3). The re-
sults show that general exploration in knowledge
space has a positive effect on an organization’s
propensity to add any label. But the effect of
exploration is smaller by an order of magnitude
as compared to the effect of proximity. An orga-
nization’s proximity to labels it already claims
does not have a statistically significant effect on
adding a new label. Importantly, our main results
persist. Estimations run on all organizations in
the press release data, where nonpatenters are
assigned knowledge proximity zero, gives similar
results (model 4). Results are also similar when
we control for leniency using a binary variable
that indicates whether the organization affiliates
with a high-leniency label, defined using the same
cutoff.
Dropping Labels
The next set of analyses explores the effects of
knowledge-space proximity on the hazard of drop-
ping a label. Table 4 reports estimations on the
hazard of dropping a label for the independent
variables in the analysis (all estimations include
controls; full models available upon request). The
first model in Table 4 provides a test of H2. This
analysis considers dyads of organizations and la-
bels that they affiliate with. The results support
H2: the higher an organization’s proximity to a
label in knowledge space, the less likely it will
drop its affiliation with that label (p < 0.05 in
a z-score test). This specification also includes
an effect of the organization’s knowledge space
proximity to all other unclaimed labels. This
effect is positive. In some estimations (Table 4,
models 4 and 5), the effect is positive and sig-
nificant. Together, these results illustrate the
dynamic link between feature space location and
label assignments: the closer is an organization
is to a label it already claims, the less likely it is
to drop this label. The closer it is to other labels
it does not claim, the more likely it is to drop a
claimed label (and adopt the new label to which
it has become proximate).
The second model in Table 4 provides tests of
H4, concerning the effects of leniency on hazards
of dropping a label. The coefficients have the pre-
dicted signs but they do not differ significantly
according to a chi-square test. Consistent with
the hypothesis, proximity to a constraining label
has a negative and significant effect on the hazard
of dropping (z-score test significant at p < 0.01),
whereas the effect for lenient labels is weaker and
not significant. To explore this effect further, we
increased the leniency threshold from 2.7 to 3.0,
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Table 3: Effects of Proximity and Leniency on the Hazards of Adding a Label (ML Estimates of
Piecewise-Continuous Hazard Models)
Hyp. 1 Hyp. 3 Hyp. 3 Hyp. 3
(Patenters) (Patenters) (Patenters) (All Orgs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
K-space proximity
Focal label 1.049†
(0.243)
Constraining focal label 1.548† 1.470† 1.464†
(0.208) (0.195) (0.199)
Lenient focal label 0.442 0.205 −0.069
(0.368) (0.370) (0.324)
Other not claimed label(s) 0.153† 0.135†
(0.025) (0.023)
Label(s) org claims 0.063 0.051
(0.057) (0.053)
Log pseudo-likelihood −23,769.69 −23,754.75 −23,717.94 −75,284.90
Degrees of freedom 28 29 31 31
Note: All specifications include: label controls for leniency, fuzzy density, recent adds, recent drops,
and label tenure (since 1990); organizational controls for the number of labels the organization claims,
the number of other labels in the industry, a count of the organization’s patents, tenure (since 1990),
whether it ranked in the Software 500, recently received venture capital financing, and the time since
adding any label; year fixed effects and duration pieces.
Patenters: 337,800 org-label dyads over 1,434,096 org-label-years; 5,266 events of adding a label.
All orgs: 1,893,569 org-label dyads over 6,485,521 org-label-years; 15,103 events of adding a label.
∗ p < 0.05; † p < 0.01
and the results strongly support the hypothesis
(model 3). This effect persists when we include
a control for an organization’s proximity to the
other labels it already claims (model 4). An esti-
mation on all organizations in the press-release
data (model 5) also shows similar effects. In ad-
dition, consistent results hold when we control
for leniency using a binary variable.
This analysis highlights the importance of the
existential quantification in the definition of le-
niency: the predictions about leniency hold only
provided that one category is sufficiently more
lenient than another. In this analysis, these ef-
fects are evident when the leniency threshold
is increased, suggesting that there exists a le-
niency threshold above which the link between
the spaces breaks down. Overall, this analysis
provides some support for H4. Together with
the results reported here, it provides additional
evidence that leniency weakens the relationship
between feature values and label affiliations. It
also suggests that feature-space proximity has a
stronger influence on the propensity to drop a
lenient label as compared to the propensity to
adopt a lenient label.
Proximity to other labels the organization af-
filiates with has a negative effect on the hazard
of dropping the focal label, and it is significant in
analyses of all organizations (z-score test signifi-
cant at p < 0.01). Again, the size of the effect is
substantially smaller than the effect of knowledge-
space proximity to the focal label (from the dyad).
This indicates that there might be some symbiotic
effects in terms of the feature profiles of labels a
producer simultaneously claims.
One potential concern is that organizations
might generally be more proximate to lenient
labels and that this drives the results in both
the estimates for both adding and dropping la-
bels. Our data show that the distributions of
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Table 4: Effects of Proximity and Leniency on the Hazards of Dropping a Label (ML Estimates of
Piecewise-Continuous Hazard Models)
Hyp. 2 Hyp. 4 Hyp. 4 Hyp. 4 Hyp. 4
(Patenters) (Patenters) (Patenters) (Patenters) (All Orgs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
K-space proximity to:
Focal label −0.422∗
(0.186)
Constraining focal label −0.607† −0.716† −0.698† −0.680†
(0.212) (0.223) (0.218) (0.220)
Lenient focal label −0.251 −0.035 −0.045 −0.215
(0.260) (0.180) (0.177) (0.205)
Not claimed label(s) 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.062∗ 0.108†
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.031) (0.027)
Other label(s) org. claims −0.035 −0.079∗
(0.031) (0.031)
Log pseudo-likelihood −6,705.53 −6,705.05 −6,702.67 −6,701.61 −24,678.40
Degrees of freedom 29 30 30 31 31
Note: All specifications include: label controls for leniency, fuzzy density, recent adds, recent drops,
and label tenure (since 1990); organizational controls for the number of labels the organization claims,
the number of other labels in the industry, a count of the organization’s patents, tenure (since 1990),
whether it ranked in the Software 500, recently received venture capital financing, and the time
since dropping any label; year fixed effects and duration pieces. Model 3 imposes a higher leniency
threshold (see text).
Patenters: 5,967 org-label dyads over 10,908 org-label-years; 4,397 events of dropping a label.
All orgs: 21,589 org-label dyads over 39,359 org-label-years; 13,880 events of dropping a label.
∗ p < 0.05; †; p < 0.01
knowledge-space proximities to constraining and
lenient labels are similar.26
Together these results for dropping labels and
those reported for adding labels show how feature-
based proximities shape categorical affiliations in
a dynamic context. These effects are illustrated
in Figures 5 and 6. For constraining labels, there
is a strong relationship between an organization’s
proximity to the label and an increased hazard of
adding the label, and decreased hazard of drop-
ping the label. For lenient labels, the link is
weaker.
Additional Tests
We conduct additional tests of these results. Our
model proposes a coupled ecology between fea-
ture space and label space, where both positions
of organizations and meanings of categories shift
26See Tables 1 and 2.
over time. Results show that the relative dis-
tance in feature space between an organization
and category representation affects whether an
organization adds or drops the category label.
We further explore this by including in the esti-
mations a measure of organization stationarity,
which measures the percentage of the organiza-
tion’s current year citations that the organization
has previously cited (in the past four years). Or-
ganizations that score low on this measure have
moved more in knowledge space, whereas those
that score high are more stationary. We include
stationarity and an interaction between stationar-
ity and knowledge proximity to the focal label as
covariates. Results show that neither stationarity
nor the interaction have a significant effect on an
organization’s propensity to add or drop labels.
Effects reported here persist (results available
upon request). This suggests that the reported
effects do not simply reflect an organization’s
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Figure 5: Effects of knowledge proximity on the hazard of adding a label, by leniency (from Table 3,
model 3).
movement in feature space toward a stationary
category.
We also conduct additional tests to further
control for social factors that might affect an
organization’s propensity to add or drop labels.
We control for the number of organizations in a
label that have recently received venture-capital
financing. Such investments signal that an area
is promising and might give managers hope that
additional funds will follow. The hypothesized
effects are robust to the inclusion of this control.
Discussion
Constraint or Accident?
We noted that an observed pattern of label over-
lap can result from accidental circumstances or
from constraint. We suggest that these patterns
are not accidental and that they reflect differences
in constraint among labels. But if constraint is
the source of variation in the strength of cate-
gorical boundaries, where does this constraint
come from? Here we sketch an extension of the
theory that links category overlap to appeal for
producers that change positions in label space.
Suppose that an audience member lacks de-
tailed information about the feature values of two
producers but does observe label assignments.27
Consider two producers that belong to different
categories, one constraining and one much more
lenient with equal (high) typicality in their as-
signed category. Suppose that each is assigned
to some third label. Recall that our argument
implies that constraining categories normally lie
further from other categories then do lenient ones
(if the difference in leniency exceeds a critical
value). Then the definition of the typicality in
a label (ϑ) implies that the member of a con-
straining category generally experiences a greater
decline in its typicality its initial category than
is the case for the member of a lenient one. In
other words, taking on new label assignments
generally reduces typicality more for members of
constraining categories.
27This example, where label assignments are known but
feature values are not directly observed, is common in
sociological research on classification.
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Figure 6: Effects of knowledge proximity on the hazard of dropping a label, by leniency (from Table 4,
model 4).
This difference matters when the categories
involved have positive valuation. This means the
intrinsic28 appeal of a producer to a typical au-
dience member is a positive increasing function
of its typicality in the meaning of the relevant
label (Hannan et al. 2007).29 So long as the con-
cepts are positively valued, producers affiliated
with constraining labels lose more intrinsic ap-
peal when they span concepts than is the case
for those affiliated with more lenient ones.
Proposition 3. Suppose that one producer be-
longs to one but not the other category and a
second producer has the mirror image pattern of
memberships and the typicalities are equal. If
28“Intrinsic” in this context refers to degree of fit to the
agent’s aesthetics. The theory on which we build holds
that it takes engagement of the audience by the producer
to convert intrinsic appeal to actual appeal.
29Producers can have high (or low) typicality in con-
straining or lenient categories. The fact that appeal in-
creases with a producer’s typicality in a category need
not imply that audiences prefer constraining categories.
Previous research shows that venture capitalists, an im-
portant audience in the domain of our empirical study,
prefer producers in vaguely bounded categories (Pontikes
2012).
each producer adds the same third label, then the
member of the constraining category ends up with
lower intrinsic appeal in that label as compared
to the member of the more lenient category.
In this sense, members of constraining categories
have more to lose when they adopt feature values
that cause them to get assigned some additional
category membership(s). This cost is the source
of the constraint.
Dynamics of Leniency
We proposed that proposition 2 implies that le-
nient labels tend to become more lenient and
constraining labels get more constraining. Here
we describe how to derive these implications. We
use an illustration of a domain with one con-
straining label and three lenient ones in Figure 7.
(For simplicity of representation we use a Eu-
clidean space in this illustration.) In each case,
the shaded circle represents a schema (the set of
feature-value profiles that lie in these circles are
the schemas). The outer circles indicate the loca-
tions of the producers assigned the category label.
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Category A is constraining because its members
more closely fit the schema (the outer circle is
closer to the shaded one than is the case for the
other categories) and because its membership
does not overlap the memberships of the others.
Categories B, C, and D are fuzzier (many mem-
bers far from the schemas) and all three pairs
overlap.
Now consider three producers whose feature
values place them close to the producers assigned
one of the labels. As drawn, producers x1 and x2
stand at the same distance from the schema for A.
But x1 lies further from the memberships of the
other categories. Thus, according to the theory,
x1 has higher typicality in A than does x2 and
therefore has a higher hazard of being labeled
as an A. This means that the expected waiting
time to labeled membership is lower for x1. In
typical cases, x1 will be labeled an A before x2.
If this occurs, then the membership of A drifts to
the left, away from the memberships of the other
categories.
Next compare the situations for x3 and x4.
As the illustrative figure is drawn, x3 lies outside
the membership of each category. In this respect
it is similar to x1 and x2, and nearly the same
reasoning applies. This producer (x3) is slightly
further away from the schema for D than is x4;
and x3 is less proximate to the memberships of
all categories than is x4. So, there is a high
likelihood that x3 will gain the label D. If this
happens, it will cause the membership of D to
move to the right, away from the other categories,
similar to the situation with category A. But x4
is much closer to the schemas for B and C (and A
for that matter) than is x3. It has a high hazard
of becoming labeled as a member of B. If such
an event does occur, this creates a membership
overlap where one did not exist (as the figure
is drawn). Obviously this new overlap increases
the leniency of B and D. The situation is more
complicated than in the analysis of A, and the
net result depends on the flow of the stochastic
events. But there is no clear pattern as was the
case for the constraining category.
We estimated growth models (at the category
level) for leniency, specifications in which leniency
in a year depends linearly on leniency in the
previous year, the fuzzy density of the category,
its tenure, and yearly fixed effects. With either
category fixed effects or category random effects,
we find a positive and significant effect of leniency
on the growth in leniency. In other words, the
higher is a category’s leniency, the higher is its
growth rate in leniency.
These dynamics likely feed back to the schemas.
For instance, as a constraining category drifts
away from the lenient ones, what is typical of this
category is also shifting away. If, as we expect,
audience members try to capture typicality in
forming schemas, then the schema will also drift
away from the others. This makes the initially
constraining category even more distinctive.
If a lenient label remains lenient or becomes
more so, then the broad (or broadening) overlap
lowers the chance that the audience reaches a
consensus about the association of a schema with
the label. Put differently, increased leniency di-
minishes agreement about the meanings. Pockets
might develop where audiences have experience
with organizations that have one type of overlap
with a lenient label, and they might develop a
schema with respect to that subset of activities.
This likely conflicts with the schema developed by
another audience exposed to other organizations
that are members of the lenient label but have a
different set of overlaps. This might lead to a lack
of consensus about the label’s schema for relevant
audiences. Hence lenient labels might evolve to
have ambiguous and uncertain meanings. At best
their schemas are defined at a very general level.
This dynamic is reflected in the trajectory of
a number of prominent lenient categories in our
analysis. For instance, this is the process James
Kobielus refers to in his “What’s not BI?” blog,
when he states that “almost every data manage-
ment technology has been swept into BI’s gravita-
tional orbit at one time or another by somebody
somewhere” (Kobielus 2010). Gartner comes to a
similar conclusion in their 2006 magic quadrant
report on <business intelligence>, noting that
<BI> is increasing in scope to encompass more
types of users, accessing more information sources
and a wider array of applications. <BI> becomes
even more lenient over time. In Gartner’s (2006)
report, they define <business intelligence> as
“the mission of BI . . . is the access to and analy-
sis of quantitative information sources to deliver
insight that empowers decision makers”(Schlegel
et al. 2006). Their 2008 report provides an even
less constraining definition that does not specify
that the platform should connect the user with
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Figure 7: Illustration of the dynamic implications of the theory.
disparate information sources: “BI platforms en-
able users to build applications that help orga-
nizations learn and understand their business”
(Richardson et al. 2008).
A similar trend is apparent in the evolution
of <enterprise resource planning (ERP)> and
<customer relationship management (CRM)>.
Initially lenient categories, both have increased in
leniency over time to the point that they no longer
even pose the constraint that category members
produce software. Gartner’s (2010) report on
<ERP> describes the market category as having
evolved from a technology product to a strategy:
In the original definition, ERP sys-
tems’ functionality normally covers
the following areas: finance and ac-
counting . . .purchasing, human re-
source management, sales or customer
order management, and operations
management. However, Gartner now
defines ERP in a broader sense as “a
technology strategy in which opera-
tional business transactions are linked
to financial transactions, specifically
general ledger transaction.” (Hester-
mann et al. 2010)
The editors at CRM magazine similarly describe
<CRM> as having evolved from a type of soft-
ware to a business philosophy:
CRM, or Customer Relationship Man-
agement, is a company-wide business
strategy designed to reduce costs and
increase profitability by solidifying
customer loyalty. . .Once thought of
as a type of software, CRM has evolved
into a customer-centric philosophy that
must permeate an entire organization.
(CRM Magazine 21 February 2010).
These examples reflect the dynamic we described:
atypical members are more likely to be assigned
membership in a lenient label, leading to in-
creased leniency and a broadening of the label’s
social meaning.
Conclusion
In this article we argue that social categoriza-
tion is governed by an ecological dynamic in two
planes: feature space and label space. When an
actor changes its feature values or drops or adds
a label, these changes not only affect the focal
actor but also contribute to changing the mean-
ings of social categories. This, in turn, can lead
to cascades of changes in classification, with enti-
ties shifting positions in both spaces in response
to movements of others. Such uncoordinated
movements might seem to lead to chaos. On the
contrary, we suggest that this dynamic can per-
petuate a link between labels and sets of feature
values, if actors pay attention to the positions of
others and use labels accordingly. At the same
time, it is possible for categories to become le-
nient in label space, with high degrees of overlap
and vague boundaries. This creates an ecology
within label space, with proximities to other la-
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bels disrupting a clear relationship between sets
of feature values and perceived typicality in the
category. The result is that leniency weakens the
relationship between feature-based similarity and
categorical assignments.
To investigate these ideas, we built a for-
mal model relating positions in the two spaces.
Our theory implies that an object’s proximity to
labeled clusters in feature space influences the
adding or dropping of label affiliations in label
space. Furthermore, it predicts that for lenient
labels, the link between feature values and labels
weakens. The importance of expressing these
ideas in formal language comes through in our
analysis. It turns out to be tricky to formally
derive these conclusions, which suggests that they
might not be as straightforward as would appear
if expressed in natural language. Furthermore,
our analysis highlights the assumptions necessary
to arrive at our conclusions.
Our empirical analysis tests the theory’s im-
plications in the software industry. We use data
on organizations’ patents to represent positions in
feature space and affiliations with market labels
from press releases to represent positions in label
space. The results support the new theoretical
propositions. We find evidence that when produc-
ers are proximate in knowledge space to a label
they affiliate with, they are less likely to drop it.
If they lie close in knowledge space to labels they
do not affiliate with, they are more likely to drop
any label and add the more proximate one. We
also find that feature-space proximity to lenient
labels has a weaker effect on adding a label, as
compared to proximity to constraining labels.
In deciding whether to affiliate with a label,
agents compare their own feature values with
those that already claim the label. This means
that the specific features associated with labels
can (and do) change over time. Even so, a link
between features and labels can persist. The rela-
tionship between features and labels is reinforced
simply when agents observe how others are classi-
fied and respond in kind. It is informative to note
what we do not assume: it is not necessary to
have strong mechanisms of boundary enforcement
or third parties such as critics and intermediaries
to retain a link between features and labels. It is
enough for agents to infer typicality from feature-
based similarities to a labeled cluster and to label
based on typicality.
At the same time, our study shows that in-
creasing leniency weakens the relationship be-
tween features and label affiliations, resulting in
a partial decoupling between the two spaces for
lenient labels. With informal classification, both
constraint and leniency get reinforced as actors
independently navigate feature space and label
space. The result is that classification evolves to
contain a mix of categories: some constraining,
some lenient.
How labels become lenient is a different mat-
ter. Leniency likely emerges when atypical en-
tities frequently are assigned membership in a
label and do not face censure. This suggests that
a lack of boundary enforcement can foster the
emergence of lenient labels in a classification. But
importantly, these elements are not necessary to
propagate lenient labels once they exist. This
means that once a label becomes lenient, it is
likely to remain that way, even with an audi-
ence that attends to the links between labels and
feature values.
This study also indicates that actors compare
positions in feature space and label space relative
to the positions of other actors in the domain.
It is proximity to objects that are affiliated with
a label—not necessarily fixed positions in fea-
ture space—that drives labeling. In this way, a
producer can become more or less proximate to
a labeled cluster if the cluster moves in feature
space, even if the producer does not move. We
believe this captures an interesting facet of social
classification: that feature values associated with
existing categories can (and do) change, and that
changes affect perceptions of the category.
In summary, this article explores dynamics
in market classification that arise when produc-
ers compare their feature positions to those of
competitors and use these comparisons to inform
market-label affiliation. Producers evaluate how
similar their organizations are to others when
deciding whether to adopt or drop a market la-
bel. This action does not go unnoticed by others
who are similarly comparing feature positions
and label affiliations. Thus emerges an ecology of
social categories, where positions in feature space
and label space change, but a link between them
persists, resulting in a dynamic and meaningful
system of classification.
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